Equipping for military credibility

Remarks by the Hon. Matt Robson during a debate on the Government's decision to acquire 105 light armoured vehicles for the Army, 28 August 2001.

The Leader of the Opposition should be very careful about giving advice on defence. Hers is the party that saddled us with the Charles Upham. I also caution her not to offer up Max Bradford's head before any select committee. As a member of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee in the last Parliament, I remember his bumbling, stumbling performance, his attempt to hide all the serious issues - and Dr Mapp was there as well - surrounding the Charles Upham.

That was a government that tried to give us armed forces that we could not afford, and that would have been useless. The only thing they would have been used for was parading around the world as though they were some type of contribution to world security.

If the Leader of the Opposition ever gets the time, she should read about Immanuel Kant, who came out of a small town but had a world-wide influence. This particular Leader of the Opposition also comes from a small town, but she does not even have any influence in her caucus, with that nonsense about defence - talking about sedition and calling members of the Army before tribunals.

The Oath of Allegiance is actually for those people in the defence force who want to leak certain document so they can create some type of scandal. The real scandal was that under the National Government, we did not have a defence force worth its name. All we had was a grovelling pack of people who wanted to parade before either the United States or the Australians the form of defence forces that those countries wanted.

Opening up the defence debate

If accuracy, consistency, robustness and transparency of Defence financial information during the 1990s were a perennial problem, then we have the National Government to blame. The blame rests squarely with a succession of failed National Government Ministers of Defence.

I recall from my work on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee of the last Parliament that a review of defence policy processes was carried out in 1998 by the former State Services Commissioner, Don Hunn. He found that the restructuring brought about by the Defence Act 1990 had not allowed the Ministry of Defence (as it should have allowed that ministry) to ensure that defence advice to Government was a consistent with whole-of-Government policies and priorities, including fiscal priorities.

He reported on the "extraordinary difficulty" the MOD's policy division had, in getting from the NZDF the information it needed. His report stated: "Even more problematic, it seems, is persuading some parts of the Defence Force to open their books." The books remained closed right to the end of the 1990s, and inadequate National Party ministers never discouraged those habits of self-serving secrecy and obscurantism.

The result was that when Derek Quigley was investigating the F-16 deal immediately after the change of Government, Treasury officers assisting him could not get inside the NZDF's financial systems to assess the reliability of certain data. They had to travel to Washington to obtain crucial information that the NZDF either did not hold, could not find, or would not release.

It took a Centre-Left Coalition Government - a Labour Alliance Coalition - to open the books, which is what we did in May of this year. The defence debate is now more open, and better informed, than it has ever been.

Uncertain purpose and lack of credibility during the 1990s

During the 1990s,the defence forces languished badly. That was a failure of political leadership - National Party lack of leadership, which it still suffers from today, as Michelle Boag constantly reminds us. Senior Defence Force officers, uncertain of their purposes in the post-Cold-War situation, and with only backwards-looking White Papers to guide them, pursued single-Service agendas.

It took a comprehensive reassessment by Parliament of what the purposes of the Defence Force should be in the years beyond 2000 to stop the rot.

Throughout the 1990s, from a Defence Force perspective, none of its output classes had been sufficiently well funded. The directed level of capability (DLOC) criteria set out in the Purchase Agreement between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence Force had to be adjusted each year, on the basis of professional military judgement, to levels that were attainable in terms of the resources available. If more money had been available:

· The DLOC criteria would have been be adjusted upwards.

· The training and exercising tempo would have been speeded up.

· Equipment state would have been upgraded, in terms of both quantity and quality.

· Maintenance schedules would have been stricter.

· More live firing of munitions would have been affordable.

· Staffing establishments could have been filled.

· A higher state of readiness could have been maintained.

· Sustainability of peacekeeping operations for longer periods would not have been a problem.

None of this happened, because the money was not available.

All these issues led the select committee, in 1998-99, to propose that the old "balanced force" concept (just a euphemism for keeping everything, and resulting in not being able to do anything much really well) had to be thrown out. It was better to do some things really well, than to try and maintain, as was Government policy at the time, semi-equipped, half-trained forces at a low state of readiness.

Don't forget how, during the 1990s, the readiness of frigates to address certain contingencies was slipped out from 28 days to 60 days. That is just one example of the slippage that occurred, and although it may not have hit the headlines in New Zealand, its significance was not lost to overseas observers.

There was a massive credibility gap between the National Government's rhetoric and reality.

The Defence Beyond 2000 report noted that:

…the [National] Government has not identified defence expenditure as a strategic priority; nor is any of the other four political parties represented on our committee advocating a greater share of national resources to defence.

Preparedness: readiness and sustainability

So the select committee proposed that New Zealand should prioritise likely contingencies, and ensure that we had force elements at a high state of readiness, and sustainable, to address these contingencies. The present Government agrees with that proposition, and I know that New Zealand First's Ron Mark will, because he was on that committee and this Government has carried out the recommendations to which he was a party.

The very first consequence of going for depth rather than breadth as a force development strategy is that it promotes interdependence. It indicates to defence partners overseas that we are serious about maintaining well-equipped, highly-trained force elements at a high state of readiness, and that those force elements are sustainable. Collectively with our friends, we can plan on that basis.

Going for depth rather than breadth also acknowledges what has always been the case, that New Zealand does not enter into military commitments overseas, alone. An independent military capability, as some supporters of the balanced force advocate, is politically and militarily nonsense. An interdependent military capability is what we have always had.

Interoperability with Australia

Interoperability with our most likely defence partners is of course essential, and our most important partner is Australia. During the 1990s, it became quite clear, in relation to both Bougainville and East Timor, that New Zealand's peacekeeping commitments to the north and northeast of Australia are an important and immediate responsibility.

Our Government maintains armed forces for their utility, not for display. I see the task in hand in East Timor as being of much greater political importance than, for example, the traditional "key objective" set out in the current Defence Policy Framework

· to play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Everybody recognises that that particular key objective has always been put forward by Defence as a substantial reason for maintaining existing levels of capability in the air combat force, the naval combat force and the maritime patrol force.

Give them the tools, and they will do the job

The light armoured vehicles that are being purchased for the New Zealand Defence Force will enable the New Zealand Government to make a solid and sustainable commitment to peacekeeping operations

New Zealand soldiers have a well-earned reputation for high combat-training standards and versatility. We are giving them the tools to do the job.

That is what the LAV-III purchase is all about.