Agricultural Security Consultative Committee

Good morning. Thank you for the chance to say a few words here today.

At the risk of repeating some of the things you may have already covered this morning, I want to provide an overview of current biosecurity issues and outline some of the changes presently underway.

Government's commitment to bio-security issues

Firstly though, I'd like to emphasise the Government's commitment to biosecurity issues. New Zealand's border requires a significant biosecurity barrier given the unique plant and animal environment of our small island nation.

The Government considers any breach of New Zealand's biosecurity to be a serious matter. As far as I'm concerned there are no excuses for breaching New Zealand's biosecurity laws.

The determination of some to breach our biosecurity net at the border, regardless of the consequences is a cause for concern. The agricultural sector and New Zealand at large are very dependent upon our current border control systems. It's a fact that in an increasingly seamless trade environment, we need to manage any risks at the border very carefully.

1999 marks the 16th anniversary of CER. Bilateral trade has increased over that period by 275%, which is largely a reflection of the success of CER. Australia is now New Zealand's largest export market, with exports to Australia rising from 8 percent of total exports to 20 percent over this period.

However, there are a number of sanitary and phytosanitary access issues that are still to be resolved, some of which have been around for a considerable length of time.

With the removal of quantitative restrictions on agricultural trade in the Uruguay Round, both Australia and New Zealand are well aware of the potential use of SPS measures for the purpose of providing an alternative form of protection for agricultural and horticultural producers. We must carefully guard against this and work at the international level to establish consistent principles and approaches to applying SPS measures.

It is important to remember that our borders can never be guaranteed 100% safe as the latest finding of the sod web worm which is believed to have blown over from Australia. The balance lies in ensuring that the money Government spends on protecting our borders is targeted to where it can achieve the best results.

Presently four Government departments have operational responsibilities for biosecurity - MAF, the Department of Conservation, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Health.

Other agencies with an interest in biosecurity (although with no operational role), are the Ministry for the Environment, ERMA and the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology.

In 1997 when Simon Upton was Minister of Biosecurity, he established the Biosecurity Council to co-ordinate the activities of these agencies and ensure a consistent approach to decision-making. I have maintained the association with the Council, as I believe it provides an invaluable mechanism for co-ordinating advice on strategic biosecurity matters, especially in the areas of:

- setting priorities for the outputs purchased by Government;
- responses to biosecurity risks; and
- the appropriate level of protection for New Zealand.

In recent months I have signalled a number of areas for reform.

Namely:
- the Biosecurity Council;
- the Food Agency/ Biosecurity Agency split.
- pest management; and
- the border review

The Biosecurity Council

Last December the terms of reference for the Council were revised and the membership changed. In addition a group was needed that could focus on specific biosecurity issues and work through the technical details.

The Biosecurity Technical Forum has been set up for this purpose. It will look at policy, technical and operational matters before they are brought to the Council for consideration or approval. Membership will include the head of the new Biosecurity Agency and the secretariat of the Biosecurity Council.

The secretariat is an important link between these two groups and also between the four departments with operational responsibilities.

Food / Biosecurity agency split

This leads me to the new Biosecurity Agency which will come into effect from 1 July 1999. The Biosecurity Agency will be headed by Barry O'Neil who is currently the Chief Veterinary Officer in MAF.

It is my intention that the new Biosecurity Agency will provide a more integrated approach to biosecurity. The Biosecurity Agency will be responsible for providing an overview of national biosecurity issues and using resources more strategically.

It will take the lead in co-ordination of biosecurity activities across the four operational departments. It will administer the Biosecurity Act and continue to develop expertise in risk management, hazard identification, risk assessment and risk communication. It will also have a role in the provision of animal or plant health assurances to trading partners in accordance with negotiated protocols.

Pest management strategies

One of the challenges facing MAF over the next few years is to develop and implement pest management strategies for some 30-odd exotic animal diseases.

The crux of the issue will be who pays. I'm aware that there is still significant disagreement among industry on this issue, but the Government remains firm in its view that the cost should be spread more evenly. In determining who pays, I acknowledge that there will be ongoing debate about who the beneficiaries and who the exacerbators are, and what their level of contribution should be.

It will not be possible to develop strategies for every conceivable exotic organism, but we must have contingency plans ready for those that might appear here from time to time, or those that we know will have a devastating effect if they do occur here.

Pest management strategies are now in place in almost all regions to cover pests of concern at the local level. And two national strategies are in place to deal with diseases that are widespread in New Zealand: the bovine tuberculosis strategy managed by the Animal Health Board, and the American foulbrood strategy managed by the National Beekeepers' Association.

The development of these two strategies has not been an easy task, but I believe that many of the difficulties that these two agencies experienced have been overcome through amendments to the Biosecurity Act.

All the regional and national strategies, deal with pests that are already in New Zealand. They have been developed in consultation and partnership with those communities affected by the pests they cover.

The same degree of partnership is now needed to deal with pests that are not yet in New Zealand. The next challenge is therefore to develop pest management strategies in co-operation with affected industries. Such strategies are in essence contingency plans of what will be done, how and by whom. They provide a type of insurance that certain agreed actions will occur if the organism of concern is ever found here.

This will not be an easy task but it is an extremely necessary one. Gone are the days of relying on Government to fund responses to all incursions of exotic organisms. I am not saying that Government has no role here. Government does have a role, but in partnership with those affected. Funding should be shared between those who can be identified as benefiting from the control measures and those who have contributed to the problem.

Border review

One of the obvious ways to achieve effective pest management is to ensure that we have robust systems at the border. That's one of the reasons the Government has commissioned an independent review of the activities at the border.

The review team, Sir Ron Carter, Dr Peter O'Hara and Rick Christie, will advise on options for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of New Zealand's border control systems. Collectively the review team have a wealth of knowledge to draw on. They will look at all the options from a single border agency, to the status quo.

Their terms of reference include:
- options for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of border control machinery;
- the desirability and vulnerability of amalgamating functions carried out by Government agencies into a single border agency; and
- the relative costs, benefits and timeframes for implementation.

Already the submissions are rolling in and the report back from the review team is due 1 December 1999.

The review will look at the border operations of MAF and the New Zealand Customs Service, as well as the secondary processing undertaken by the Immigration Service, and the functions of the Aviation Security Service. The review will also consider the implementation of the policy and regulatory objectives that are achieved through the border agencies.

Conclusion

In conclusion I'd like to stress the Government's commitment to Biosecurity issues. I know a common criticism is that if the pest occurred in New Zealand, then the systems at the border have failed it is the Government's responsibility. I do not accept that argument.

Firstly, we cannot be sure that the organism came in past our border control people. Some organisms arrive here naturally. Secondly, border controls are in place to manage risks. And, as I am sure you know, New Zealand does not operate a zero risk trade policy. We operate under a risk management framework. We simply would not trade if we accepted a zero level of risk. We are a trading nation and need to be able to import where it is safe to do so, and in turn export our goods without undue restrictions.

Thank you