
**Preliminary Investigation into the Collapse
of a Balcony at 598 Castle Street, Dunedin**

March 2016



Executive Summary

On the evening of the 4 March 2016 a cantilevered balcony at 598 Castle St, Dunedin, collapsed during a music concert attended by up to 1500 people in a residential accommodation area. Eighteen students were injured as a result of the collapse including two receiving serious injuries.

The Minister for Building and Housing subsequently instructed the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) to investigate the cause of the collapse, and whether the balcony was designed, constructed and maintained to the required standards. Because structural failures of buildings are rare in New Zealand, every incident of this sort needs to be thoroughly investigated to establish whether there were failings and whether our building systems are working as they should.

A Terms of Reference for conducting the investigation was developed and an MBIE investigation team was established. A site inspection was undertaken to analyse the building that the balcony was attached to, the damaged balcony itself and the relevant documentation relating to the construction.

The balcony was cantilevered from the first-level floor of a two-storey building that was part of a privately owned student accommodation complex designed in 1999, consented by the Dunedin City Council in December 1999 and constructed shortly after. The Code Compliance Certificate for the completion of the complex was issued by the Dunedin City Council in November 2003.

The preliminary conclusions of the investigation are:

- The primary cause of the collapse was the number of people congregated on the balcony at the time of collapse significantly exceeded the design capacity of the timber joists supporting the balcony.
- The structural design of the balcony met the standards of the day and its construction met Building Code requirements at the time.
- There were no observable defects or deterioration that would have contributed to the collapse.
- A design detail permitted at the time the balcony was constructed and remains permitted under the current NZ Standard NZS 3604: 2011, the notching of the balcony timber joists at the step between the first floor and the balcony, may be a contributing factor. Further research is required to clarify whether changes need to be made to the Standard and what, if anything needs to be done about other balconies built in a similar manner.
- Design standards have changed since the balcony was constructed and required timber joist sizes for this type of structure have increased. It is unlikely that, given a similar level of student congregation on a similar balcony built to current standards, the balcony would have collapsed.
- This collapse highlights the brittle and sudden manner in which cantilevered balconies can collapse. Public education is recommended so that people understand the risks and use balconies appropriately. In this case they were designed for normal domestic use, not as public grandstands which have higher loading expectations.

The recommendations of this preliminary investigation are as follows:

- MBIE commissions research, including physical testing of full-sized test specimens, to determine the reduction in strength of cantilevered timber joists with notches to form stepped joists.
- MBIE uses research results and related analyses to determine the capacity of notched cantilevered timber joists. Depending on the research results, the NZ Standard NZS 3604: 2011 may need to be changed to amend the use of notched cantilevered joists.
- MBIE develops guidance and supporting communications on the safe use of domestic balconies.
- Depending on the results of the research into notched cantilevered joists, MBIE may need to provide advice to homeowners with similarly constructed balconies to seek professional design advice and to provide guidance on remedial actions.

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Introduction

On the evening of the 4 March 2016 a cantilevered balcony at 598 Castle St, Dunedin, collapsed during a music concert attended by up to 1500 people in a residential accommodation area. Eighteen students were reported injured as a result of the collapse including two students receiving serious injuries. The collapsed balcony was one of several similar elevated balconies that cantilevered from a group of buildings that surrounded the area where the concert was held. It was situated in a privately owned student accommodation complex designed in 1999, consented by Dunedin City Council in December 1999 and a Code Compliance Certificate issued at the completion of construction in November 2003.

The Minister for Building and Housing subsequently instructed the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) to investigate the cause of the collapse, and whether the balcony was designed, constructed and maintained to the required standards. Because structural failures of buildings are rare in New Zealand, every incident of this sort needs to be thoroughly investigated to establish whether there were failings and whether our building systems are working as they should.

A Terms of Reference for this investigation is included in Appendix A.

This report summarises video and photographic evidence of the collapse, and information gained from an on-site inspection of the balcony by MBIE Engineers. It provides preliminary findings about the causes of the collapse and recommendations for further action.

Investigation Methodology

This section outlines the methodology and procedures adopted to undertake the investigation. This includes the establishment of an investigation team, the physical inspections that were conducted and the information collected.

■ Investigation team

The investigation team comprised the Chief Engineer, the Manager Engineering Design and Science, the Manager Building Systems Control, the Deputy Chief Engineer, the Team Leader Consent System and structural engineers from the Building System Performance Branch of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE). The team was selected on the basis of their experience and expertise, and had no conflicts of interest with the investigation.

External experts were consulted to provide advice on technical aspects of the investigation.

■ Inspections

Two members of the MBIE team visited Dunedin on Tuesday 7 March 2016 to:

- Obtain relevant documentation from the Dunedin City Council, the building consenting authority.
- Visit the building site to photograph and record physical details of the remains of the balcony attached to the building. A sample of timber was taken from the balcony remains for further analysis.
- Inspect, measure and photograph the remains of the collapsed balcony that had been removed from the building site and placed in storage by the New Zealand Police.

■ Information collected

Documentation

The following design documents and reports were obtained for the investigation:

- Dunedin City Council Consent number ABA 993045 issued 9th December 1999 for 8 units to be constructed at 820 Cumberland Street, between Castle and Cumberland streets. The collapsed balcony in unit 6 was constructed under this consent.
- Dunedin City Council Consent number ABA 3156 for an additional 5 units at 598 Castle Street, which also provides access to the other 8 units.
- Dunedin City Council Code of Compliance Certificate for consents ABA 993045 and ABA 3156, issued 24th November 2003.
- DCL Consulting report “598 Castle Street, Dunedin: Investigation into balcony collapse” commissioned by the Dunedin City Council.

The following design standards were obtained to assist with analysing the balcony:

- NZ Standard NZS 3604: 1990 – the timber framed buildings standard cited in ABA 993045.

- NZ Standard NZS 3604: 1999 – the timber framed buildings standard at the time of construction.
- NZ Standard NZS 3604: 2011 – the current version of timber framed buildings standard.
- NZ Standard NZS 4203: 1992 – the loadings code for buildings at the time of construction.
- NZ Standard NZS 3603: 1993 – the timber structures standard at the time of construction and the current standard.

Video photography

Dunedin Police supplied MBIE with video footage of the collapse that was recorded by Taylormade Productions. This video footage was intended to record the band's performance in the courtyard.

Physical evidence

The Balcony

The balcony remnant comprised a complete balcony floor with all the joists severed at the wall face. The balustrade along the front and one side of the balcony had broken away. No evidence of decay or deterioration of the wood in any of the joists in the vicinity of the fractures was observed during the 7 March 2016 site visit by MBIE.

The cantilever span of the balcony was measured as 1230 mm from the outside of the wall panel to the outside of the boundary joist. The joist spacing was nominally 400 mm. The overall plan dimensions of the balcony were measured as 1230 mm x 4000 mm.

The Building

At the time of the MBIE site visit to the building at 598 Castle Street a temporary piece of cladding had been installed to cover the failed ends of the joists over half the balcony length. In the remaining uncovered part of the wall where the balcony had been located, the ends of the failed joists were able to be inspected.

Through openings in the blocking between the failed joists it could be seen that the failed joists had colour flashes along their length, which indicated they had been machine stress graded. Of the three failed joists observed only green and black flashes were visible over a 2.2 m length extending into the building from the failure point. From this and the date of construction it was inferred that the joists would have been used as equivalent to *Radiata Pine* No. 1 Framing.

■ General investigation procedures

Analyses were undertaken to determine the principal causes of the failure, taking into account the information and evidence collected. The design and construction of the balcony were checked for compliance with the construction standards of the day and whether the balcony would comply with current standards. Expert opinions were also sought on several technical aspects of the investigation.

Review and Analysis of the Balcony

This section assesses the Building Code compliance of the balcony, analyses the actions resulting from the crowd loading and assesses the effects of the loading on the joists supporting the balcony.

■ Building Code compliance

A review of the relevant consent drawings (Appendix C) indicates the balcony was designed with eleven cantilevered joists spaced at 400 mm centres, projecting 1200 mm from the external face of the building framing and extending 1800 mm into the floor to double floor joists running at right angles to the balcony's joists. The drawings show the joists as continuous nominal 200 mm x 50 mm members. The finished size of the joists was measured as 190 mm x 45 mm with a 50 mm step down that reduces the size to 140 mm x 45 mm.

The designed joist dimensions comply with Table 7.2 of the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604: 1990.

As the structural design followed a cited standard there was no requirement for a structural review of the design and there was no evidence in the documentation that a structural review was undertaken.

The design standard of the day anticipated a loading of 10-12 people distributed evenly over the balcony.

The Timber Framed Buildings Standard was revised in 2011 and Table 7.2 of NZS 3604: 2011 requires the net depth of supporting joists to be 190 mm x 45 mm for a balcony span of 1200 mm. The balcony design would not comply with the current Timber Famed Buildings Standard NZS 3604: 2011.

■ Balcony collapse – review of video footage

The supplied video was analysed to better understand the collapse mechanism. It appears there were approximately eighteen people standing on the balcony at the time of collapse. More individuals were crowded at the right hand end (as viewed) of the balcony, which was closer to the entry door and the location of the band.

Shortly after the headlining band started playing, it was observed that towards the crowded right-hand end of the balcony people moved up and down in time with the music. There is no evidence this was to the extent of jumping where their feet left the deck. Soon afterwards the front right-hand corner of the balcony dropped and then the whole balcony rotated approximately 45 degrees before separating from the building and dropping vertically to the ground. Collapse was rapid and the people both on the balcony and underneath it were unable to take evasive action.

■ Balcony loading at the time of collapse

The balcony was significantly overloaded as a result of the number of people occupying the balcony at the time of its collapse and the dynamic effects of their movement. The weight of eighteen people, including an allowance for dynamic loading due to the movement of people, is calculated to be on average over the whole deck area approximately double the 2.0 kPa live load used as the basis of design in the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604:1990. Additionally, more people were

observed to be crowded towards the right hand end of the balcony, closer to where the band was commencing to play, and some of the joists may have therefore had nearly four times the design loading. Because of uncertainty of the weights of the occupants and their distribution across the balcony, it is not possible to be more precise about the actual loading.

■ **Fracturing of the joists supporting the balcony**

It is not yet clear to what extent the failure of the balcony joists may have been contributed to by the notches in the joists at the junction between the floor of the building and the balcony. The joists fractured at the location of the step change in the depth of the joist, from 190 mm beneath the flooring inside the building to 140 mm beneath the balcony deck. This step or notch detail is permitted by the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604: 1990, although there are no explicit criteria or guidance on the permissible depth of the notch for cantilevered floor joists supporting a balcony. The current NZS 3604: 2011 also permits this detail, with no explicit guidance on permitted notch dimensions.

The provisions of the Timber Structures Standard NZS 3603:1993 for the strength of notched beams were applied to the balcony joists to determine the potential effect of the notches on their capacity to carry loads. Calculations indicate the notches reduced the capacity of the balcony's cantilevered joists, although by how much is not clear at this stage of the investigation.

There is limited information on the effect of notches on the capacity of cantilevered timber joists such as those used in the collapsed balcony. Further research is required to determine strength reduction factors due to notches near the supports of cantilevered timber joists.

■ **Testing of timber samples**

Two timber samples and a series of photos were sent to SCION Research Institute to try and identify the grading and treatment properties of the timber joists from the recovered remains of the balcony. MBIE is awaiting the results of these tests.

Investigation Results

The main findings of this preliminary investigation into the collapsed balcony at 598 Castle Street in Dunedin are as follows.

■ **Code compliance, condition of balcony joists and design standards**

The balcony was Building Code compliant at the time of its construction and there were no observable deterioration or defects that would have contributed to its collapse. The balcony would not be compliant with the current requirements of the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604: 2011. It is unlikely that the balcony would have collapsed if it was constructed to the current Timber Framed Building Standard NZS 3604: 2011.

■ **The balcony was overloaded**

The balcony was significantly overloaded by a combination of the number of people occupying the balcony at the time of its collapse and the dynamic effects of their movement. The live and dynamic loads resulting from the eighteen students observed on the balcony at the time of its collapse was at least double the design load of 2.0 kPa assumed in the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604:1990 used to design the balcony. Some of the right hand joists may have been loaded up to four times the design load. This was the primary cause of the collapse.

■ **The balcony joists may have been weaker than expected**

At this stage of the investigation it is not clear whether the effects of notching timber beams were adequately considered in the design of balcony joists used in domestic construction, as per the provisions of the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604: 1990. Further, it is not clear whether the current provisions for notched beams in the Timber Structures Standard, NZS 3603:1993, and the Timber Framed Buildings Standard NZS 3604: 2011 are adequate for the design of cantilevered joists. Research, including experimental testing, should be undertaken to validate existing provisions in Standards for notched beams.

■ **Safe use of cantilevered balconies**

The collapse highlights the brittle and sudden manner in which cantilevered balconies can collapse. Public education is recommended so that people understand the risks and use balconies appropriately. In this case they were designed for normal domestic use, not as public grandstands which have higher loading expectations.

Recommendations

In response to the findings of this preliminary investigation the following actions are recommended for the safe design and use of cantilevered timber decks and similar structures.

- MBIE commissions research, including physical testing of full-sized test specimens, to determine the reduction in strength of cantilevered timber joists with notches to form stepped joists.
- MBIE uses research results and related analyses to determine the capacity of notched cantilevered timber joists. Depending on the research results, the NZ Standard 3604: 2011 may need to be changed to amend the use of notched cantilevered joists.
- MBIE develops guidance and supporting communications on the safe use of domestic balconies.
- Depending on the results of the research into notched cantilevered joists, MBIE may need to provide advice to homeowners with similarly constructed balconies to seek professional design advice and to provide guidance on remedial actions.

Acknowledgements

MBIE would like to thank the owner of the building and the various agencies for providing their time and information to allow MBIE to conduct the investigation.

Appendix A Terms of Reference

The investigation is to be conducted under the following terms of reference.

Scope

The scope of the investigation by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) includes:

- Liaise with Dunedin City Council, Police, WorkSafe, the building owner and other interested parties to inform them of our investigation;
- Ensure that evidence is kept secure so as to enable future testing, detailed studies, etc.;
- Review media reports, photographs and video evidence from eyewitnesses;
- Review video evidence supplied by Animation Research Ltd;
- Carry out a site visit to record details of the physical state of the collapsed balcony and its fixing to the supporting structure;
- Determine and review the method used in the structural design of the balcony;
- Review the design drawings and specification for the balcony;
- Determine whether the balcony was designed in accordance with the standards of the day and complied with the Building Code;
- Determine whether the balcony was constructed in accordance with the design drawings and specifications;
- Determine whether the design used the correct permanent and imposed design actions and combined them correctly;
- Determine whether the balcony was strong enough to resist the design actions at the time of its construction;
- Identify any possible deterioration of structural elements at the time of the collapse;
- Test, if possible, the timber properties (strength, stiffness) of the cantilevered joists to determine whether they met the assumed design properties;
- Identify the history of changes to design standards since the balcony was designed and determine the effect of changes in standards on how the balcony would be structurally designed today and in the intervening years;
- Conduct structural analyses of the as built and design cases, including allowable loading and likely actual loading;
- Establish whether the imposed design actions adequately represented the weight of balcony occupants;
- Establish whether movement of the balcony occupants could have contributed to the collapse;
- Identify causes of the collapse;
- Determining whether the same situation could cause balconies constructed with other materials to collapse in a similar manner;

- Recommend any changes to building regulations for new balconies or other possible uses where similar detailing might have been used; and
- Recommend any remedial actions for existing balconies.

Report

A draft report on the findings of the investigation will be prepared for the Minister by MBIE by the 31 March 2016. The report may be subject to peer review by independent experts.

A communications plan on the release of the report will be developed.

Management

The manager responsible for this investigation is Dr Larry Bellamy, Manager Engineering Design and Science, MBIE, with technical assistance provided by Mike Stannard, Chief Engineer, MBIE.

Appendix B Selection of Photographs



Appendix C Relevant Drawings of Balcony



