Government Responds To Defence Committee Report

The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee's Defence Beyond 2000 interim report provides a useful focus for debate on defence policy, Defence Minister Max Bradford says.

The Government's response to the Committee's interim report was tabled in Parliament this afternoon. Of the Committee's 19 recommendations, Mr Bradford said the Government agrees with or will consider 11, but considers eight are somewhat wide of the mark.

"The Government is pleased to accept such important recommendations as the need to continue its current drive to develop vital peacekeeping training and place more emphasis on interoperability with our potential defence partners," Mr Bradford said.

"However, the Government does not agree with the interm report's suggestion that the Defence Force's present range of capabilities should be narrowed. We need to retain a balanced force wide enough to give New Zealand a range of options, rather than a niche force which may not meet our future needs.

"Because of the long-term nature of defence planning, the decisions we make today about the shape of our Defence Force set the path and parameters for some decades to come. While we sincerely hope we will never again have to send our young service men and women into active combat, no one has a crystal ball to predict the future in 10, 20 or more years time. This means it is important to maintain a flexible Defence Force."

Mr Bradford said the Government awaits with interest the Committee's final report.

Media Inquiries: Ann Howarth, press secretary to Hon Max Bradford, (04) 4719-836 or 025 424 565

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO "DEFENCE BEYOND 2000" A summary of the Government's Response

The Government's response to the Interim Report is in three parts: an overview dealing with broad policy issues raised by the InterimReport and which are not covered in the responses to the recommendations; the responses to the recommendations; and some additional comments and observations on other points raised in the Interim Report.

Overview

The overview acknowledges the value of the Interim Report instimulating discussion and debate about defence policy. Among the points made in the overview are the following:

The absence of any foreseeable military threat does not meanthat we can discard the risk that in the future force might be used against New Zealand or its interests. It takes time to achieve and maintain competent combat units while threats invariably develop much more quickly. (Pages 2 & 3) Combat skills are the foundation for New Zealand sharing with its friends and allies the security burden in the region. (Page 3) The Government agrees that peacekeeping is important but there is a need to shape the Defence Force for a full range of tasks, not only peacekeeping. This is not a problem as a forcefit for combat is also fit for peacekeeping. The reverse is not true. (Page 5) The Government does not agree with the Committee's view that the global security setting should determine our security strategy. Our security strategy is governed by events in the Asia-Pacific region. This has implications for our force structure. The region is predominantly maritime and a narrow range of capabilities focussed on the land forces, as suggested in the Interim Report, would limit the Government's options to respond in a crisis. The Government needs a balanced force that provides it with sufficient options to respond to a wide array of security challenges. (Pages 5 & 6) Our three services are able to operate together. A joint force approach is not considered appropriate for New Zealand's circumstances. (Page 7) The Government does not agree with the assumption in the Interim Report that the present balanced force is not sustainable. Our level of defence spending is not high as a percentage of national income. It is a question of choice, not just affordability. (Page 8)

Recommendations

The Government agrees with the following recommendations either in whole or in part:

Recommendation 2 (peacekeeping training for the NZDF) - page 10 Recommendation 3 (deployable battalion group) - page 11 Recommendation 4 (territorial force) - page 12 Recommendation 5 (air combat force) - page 13 Recommendation 12 (NZDF performance targets) - page 21 Recommendation 14 (costs of existing and new equipment) - page 23

The Government does not agree with the following recommendations either in whole or in part:

Recommendation 1 (Army and Police responsibility for terrorism) - page10 Recommendation 9 (recombining the NZDF and the MOD) - page 19 Recommendation 11(Advisory Committee on National Security) - page 21 Recommendation 13 (assessment and audit of NZDF) - page 22 Recommendation 15 (consolidation of headquarters and review of senior ranks) - page 27 Recommendation 16 (real estate holdings) - page 30 Recommendation 18 (recruit training) - page 32 Recommendation 19 (streaming of recruits) - page 33

The Government has explained its policy in respect to the following recommendations:

Recommendation 6 (composition of the Navy's fleet) - page 14Recommendation 7 (closer relationship between defence and community assistance and youth training) - page 16 Recommendation 8 (NZDF role in civil defence) - page 18 Recommendation 9 (recombining the NZDF and the MOD) - page 19 Recommendation 17 (review of Defence Force pay and conditions) - page 31

The Government will give further consideration to recommendation 10 (amending the Defence Act 1990). - page 20

Additional comments and observations

The additional comments and observations deal with issues raised in the Interim Report which are not dealt with in the recommendations but on which the Government considers comments would be helpful. A number of issues are covered.

New Zealand's frigates and combat aircraft have been designed to meet New Zealand requirements. In the case of the frigates, it is to respond to low level security challenges close to home and operating as part of a multinational force. The combat aircraft are intended to operate in maritime strike, close air support and air interdiction roles reflecting the fact that we are a maritime nation. A balanced force of this nature bestmeets the Government's defence policy requirements. (Pages 35 & 36)

The naval combat force is not under utilised. It has, over the last five years, spent 60% of the year undertaking such activities as exercises with the Australian Navy and being deployed in suchareas as Bougainville and the Gulf. (Page 36)

Defence policy and defence planning are closely integrated as part of New Zealand's overall security policy and address bothmilitary and non-military security requirements. (Page 37)

There is no evidence to suggest an imbalance between defence spending and Overseas Development Assistance. In the event of the emergence of a threat it will be the capabilities that can be marshalled which will be important for providing aneffective response. Increasing development aid will not substantially mitigate those risks. (Page 38)

For reasons of geography, New Zealand and Australia are one strategic entity. This does not, however, relegate the interests of New Zealand to Australia. Cooperating with Australia in pursuit of New Zealand's strategic interests will protect those interests much more so than if we tried to achieve them on our own. (Page 39)

It is not Australia's expectation that our value as a defence partner requires us to concentrate on a narrow range of capabilities. The fundamental point is that the Defence Force's capabilities must be able to support New Zealand's strategic needs and interests. (Pages 39 & 40)

New Zealand force structure planning is taking into account the impact of new technology - the "Revolution in Military Affairs".(Page 40)

The Government is satisfied that the current readiness levels of our Defence Force reflect actual needs. (Page 41)

The Government agrees with the assessment of Defence officials that it would take 15 years to establish an air combatforce. It is not the number of aircraft which is the critical fact but rather the calibre of the pilots, the experience of their instructors, the technical proficiency of the ground tradesmenand the types of weapons that the force is proficient in using.Achieving these takes time. (Pages 41 & 42)

An analysis of defence expenditure shows that in 1997 New Zealand spent 1.2% on defence using the standard NATO definition. (Page 42)

The Committee raised the issue of the opportunity cost of defence expenditure. New Zealand's defence expenditure is based on meeting defence policy goals. Any employment creation or technology transfer are additional but highly important benefits. (Page 43)

The modifications to HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM did not take place immediately because they were considered a lesser priority than re-equipping the Army and improving the Air Force. Hard decisions on priorities were required. (Page 44)

New Zealand's changed role in Bougainville, while influenced by cost, was also a conscious decision based on the appropriate role and size of New Zealand's contribution. This reflects the changes that took place on the ground resulting from the transition from the Peace Monitoring Group to the Australian led Truce Monitoring Group. (Page 44)