Massey University's Centre for Defence Studies, in partnership with the Military Studies Institute, is New Zealand's leading defence education institution. As a former Associate Professor teaching international law, including the law of armed conflict, I am particularly appreciative of being hosted by an institution, and addressing an audience, that has an enduring interest in Defence.

There are three particular themes I would like to canvass that need serious consideration:

First, we need to more clearly understand how defence contributes to our security, both within our region and in respect of advancing our interests in the wider international context.

Second, New Zealand needs defence capabilities matched to our strategic interests and those capabilities must be primarily focused on a reasonably foreseeable range of military deployments.

Third, our Defence establishment needs to be more efficiently configured to manage a full range of operations and the complexity of the defence procurement process.

I come to the Defence portfolio at an important time, when decisions around these themes will be made within the next few years.

I am conscious of the impact these decisions will have in the decades ahead and how important they are for the men and women of the New Zealand Defence Force.

If such decisions are to lead to the change required they cannot be made without proper consultation and planning.

This Government made a commitment to a Defence Review as part of our election campaign and we are following through on that commitment. The Defence Review will constitute the centrepiece of the Government's work on defence in our first term.

The Associate Minister and I released the Terms of Reference for the Review on 21 April. Those Terms of Reference clearly stipulate our desire for political and public consensus on New Zealand's broad security interests.

The Defence Review will essentially comprise two documents. The Secretary of Defence will conduct a Defence Assessment, which will inform the Government's policy position and will culminate in the publication of the Government's White Paper.

We will soon release a Discussion Document intended to stimulate debate and consideration of New Zealand's defence and security issues, in which I believe all New Zealanders have a stake.

Why do we need a Defence Review? The straight answer is that we need a review because over the past decade the global security environment has clearly become more challenging. There are real questions about how well our current capabilities are matched to our evolving strategic interests.

The purpose of any Defence Review is to provide the opportunity to ensure a country's defence policies and capabilities remain appropriate and relevant in the face of changing security circumstances.

This will be a "deep" review,  meaning it will critically examine how well the Defence Force, now and in the future, meets New Zealand's security needs.

As a deep review it will provide the basis for defence policy both in the medium term, but also over the longer term, taking into account the major capabilities that will be reaching the end of their lives within the next decade.

It is worth noting that it has been more than 10 years since defence policy was critically examined. 

Although there was a Defence Review in 1997 it was widely considered that Review did not provide a good basis for the defence challenges of the future.  It did not properly consider the evolving nature of operations nor did it take into account the likely levels of expenditure and thus the nature of an affordable Defence Force.

The Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Select Committee Inquiry Defence Beyond 2000 undertook a more thorough look at defence. 

I worked very closely with the Select Committee Chair, Hon Derek Quigley, to frame the inquiry and to critically examine defence requirements for New Zealand over the next decade. 

It was clear to me, having thought about defence issues over a number of years, that defence was spread too thinly and was not appropriately configured to meet contemporary risks and challenges, either in the actual capabilities or in their general approach. 

The Select Committee inquiry essentially emphasised depth not breadth, and focused on deployable forces, particularly within our own region, and the surveillance and patrol of the South Pacific area, which requires both Navy and Air Force capabilities. 

The basic test became that the Defence Force should essentially consist of those capabilities that were likely to be used, rather than having capabilities that were unlikely to be used except in the case of general warfare. 

Options that existed when nearly 2% of GDP was spent on defence, as was the case up until the early 1990s, were not available when expenditure dropped to about 1% of GDP primarily as a result of the so-called post-Cold War "peace-dividend".

Since the 1990s, defence expenditure has remained well below Cold War levels, notwithstanding the increased level of deployments. In essence, forces that were previously largely home-based are now being deployed.

By and large this is affordable within the current budgetary framework.

An emerging consensus

There is now broad recognition that our principal security interest is ensuring the stability of our region, especially our Pacific neighbourhood.

Almost invariably New Zealand's security interests in the Pacific will be advanced in partnership with Australia. New Zealand and Australia are uniquely placed with the military capability to lead in improving security and stability in the Pacific, although we will also want to work with other Pacific states and those nations that have significant regional presence and influence, such as France and the United States.

The former Labour government largely adopted the thinking that lay behind Defence Beyond 2000, although it initially had a rather idealistic view of the world which can be summed up by the term "benign strategic environment".

However, as the past decade has so clearly demonstrated, there is nothing benign about the risks that New Zealand must help manage in our immediate region or further abroad.

I might note that the Labour government rapidly readjusted its focus following September 11 2001. It realised the Defence Force are not just police in camouflage. The outcome of this change has been a greater level of consensus about defence issues. This consensus has been illustrated by National's acceptance of the 1987 nuclear-free legislation. Everyone who deals with New Zealand has a clear understanding of our overall foreign policy and defence stance.

New Zealand's security is entwined with that of Australia's, our Pacific neighbourhood's, and that of international society. Security is not just about making our contribution in the unfortunate event of conflict between states. It is about securing New Zealand's interests, and protecting the institutions and values that help New Zealanders to live in the ways we prefer.

This involves a comprehensive view that encompasses all aspects of what security for New Zealand entails, including not just traditional national security but also the needs of nation-building, economic security, environmental security, and the protection of internationally accepted human rights. Our immediate region is faced with many of these contemporary security challenges.

New Zealand's security interests do not only sit within the South Pacific. We are an outward-looking nation, and have a deep interest in multilateral solutions to global problems. Many of these global problems need to be met by peacekeeping deployments. Many of these deployments clearly require combat-trained defence forces.

Peacekeeping is only required in societies which have fundamentally broken down. The seemingly benign foot patrol can instantly transform into combat, as has been evident in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste.

Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, noted this intertwining of security issues.

"Today, no walls can separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from national security crises in another. What begins with the failure to uphold the dignity of one life all too often ends with a calamity for entire nations."

As a consequence New Zealand will continue to make contributions beyond our region. In doing so, we usually work with longstanding partners, especially the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States.

New Zealand of course has developed well beyond this heritage. We are now much more multicultural and have a much deeper understanding of our location on the edge of Asia. Our future is increasingly bound with Asian nations. The strong relationships we have with Singapore and Malaysia have their origins in the Five Power Defence Arrangement, but their contemporary relevance rests on the growing economic and political influence of the region.

In short, a broad consensus has emerged in New Zealand about our place in the world and our region.

Defence capabilities to match regional demands

The most important value we have is freedom, with its origins deep in our cultural heritage. In his 1777 essays, the English philosopher Thomas Paine remarked:

"Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must undergo the fatigue of supporting it."

The events of the past decade have shown how difficult this task has become. Our Defence Force has been engaged in a full range of activities, from combat through to assisting civil reconstruction. 

Disciplined forces are uniquely suited to being able to provide security in failing states where all other solutions, including conventional policing, have failed. 

Contemporary security needs range from defeating or deterring insurgency through to providing conditions where civil reconstruction and nation-building can occur.

There is broad political consensus that the New Zealand Defence Force will be directly engaged in such tasks. As we consider our defence capabilities for the future we must keep in mind that we are a country with a small economy and population and, as such, we inevitably need to focus our efforts in our immediate area of interest.

Here are some numbers worth noting:

• The distance between New Zealand and Timor-Leste is 6042 kilometres


• The distance between London and Kabul is 5718 kilometres


• The distance between Auckland and Kabul is 13,424 kilometres

Arguably Timor-Leste is on the outer edge of New Zealand's immediate area of interest and I think it is fair to say that London would consider Afghanistan in similar terms - although, in a reflection of how strategic interests change over time, this would not have always been the case.

These numbers highlight the distances with which our Defence Force has to deal. Deployment of NZDF personnel to Afghanistan is roughly equivalent in distance to the UK deploying personnel to the South Pacific.

The duration and tempo of operations, the complexity of the procurement process, and the effective management of defence assets including bases, have posed greater challenges than originally envisaged. As a consequence the Defence Force has been stretched in meeting its many commitments, in its modernising equipment, and maintaining its infrastructure.

We are a country with a land area and Exclusive Economic Zone roughly comparable to Japan's or the United Kingdom's, but with a fraction of either of their populations.

We need to keep the demands of these enormous distances in mind as we consider the capabilities of our armed forces. Should, as the June 2000 Defence Policy Framework states, the emphasis be on land forces "supported by the Navy and Air Force" or should this emphasis be re-balanced?

This Government campaigned during the last election on a platform that said we would ensure the NZDF can build security within the Pacific.

Building security in the Pacific is vital to our immediate interests; it fits with our broader foreign policy goals, especially as we shift our focus to the Asia-Pacific, and it plays to the comparative strengths of our military.

Given the extent of the Pacific region, especially the maritime estate, and our remoteness from other countries, our forces must be agile and able to operate over long distances at short notice.

We have to be selective, but also able to undertake the likely range of tasks within our region.

A practical range of capabilities

During the election campaign, this Government noted that the NZDF is heavily committed on deployments, and the challenging effects long and repetitive deployments have on recruitment and retention.

We noted that some of the major assets vital to New Zealand achieving the wide variety of contemporary defence tasks will reach the end of their economic life toward the close of the next decade - for example, the C-130 Hercules aircraft.

The Review must therefore look very critically at the range of capabilities contained within the current Defence Force.

Defence forces must hold reserve capability - every Defence Force needs to plan for a wide range of contingent deployments, but a reconsideration of the level of reserve capability is needed.

Similarly, we place great stress on the utility of our Special Forces, although it is true they are a component of a larger whole.  Their merits can stand alone, but they also augment the wider strengths of the New Zealand Defence Force contained in the Army.  These strengths are:

 

• reconnaissance and surveillance;


• light patrol forces; and


• assisting civil reconstruction including engineering, medical and logistics capabilities.

 

The emphasis on New Zealand's skills in reconnaissance and surveillance can also be readily seen within the Air Force and the Navy. 

New Zealand has invested very heavily in maritime surveillance, particularly with the P3 Orions.  We are the smallest nation in the world that operates such a sophisticated capability and it has taken decades to build the level of skills that we have.

No one would doubt that as a maritime nation we would expect to have very sophisticated maritime surveillance.  One of the great values of such a capability is the adaptability for contemporary operations. 

Similarly, the Navy also has a great depth of skill in maritime surveillance both within the Naval combat force and the Naval patrol forces, as will be increasingly evident as the Protector vessels come on line.

The Defence Force also employs its maritime surveillance capabilities as part of multi-agency tasking. This includes, for example, working with Fisheries, Customs, Police, Civil Defence, Conservation, and in search and rescue.

In each of these cases, the skills within the three services combined are of paramount importance within our own region and have great utility as niche capabilities beyond our region.

These skills comprise many of the capabilities that enable the NZDF to contribute to the whole-of-government effort required to respond to the spectrum of comprehensive security requirements I have outlined.

Personnel and military partnerships

Such a broad range of tasks requires considerable expertise from our defence personnel.

I have had the privilege of visiting virtually all of our Defence camps and bases since taking office and of course in years past. The one attribute that shines through is the sheer professionalism of the NZDF.

I have recently returned from Timor-Leste, where I saw first-hand the expertise of our troops and their contribution to the security of that country. Our troops are truly excellent ambassadors for New Zealand and the values we hold.

The people and government of Timor-Leste see our contribution as the guarantor of their new-found freedom. We have a high percentage of personnel on deployment all over the world for such a small Defence Force. These deployments take their toll on those personnel and their families.

The NZDF has now, more than ever, been able to successfully integrate Maori and Polynesian cultural traditions into its contemporary operations.

These traditions have helped to shape the evolution of the NZDF's military capabilities. The fully integrated multicultural ethos is a key part of how the NZDF is able to build confidence and trust on our international deployments, wherever they may be. It is a unique advantage that we have.

This important attribute is increasingly recognised by our military partners, particularly the Australian Defence Force, as a means of bridging the cultural gap that exists between deployed forces and the local communities.

This Government also campaigned in support of defence policy that placed even greater importance on the NZDF being interoperable with the ADF - with a high level of compatibility of equipment, training and doctrine.

Australia's recently released Defence White Paper 2009 supported this emphasis, saying:

"... we must plan together on the basis that our combined operations in pursuit of our common security interests, as has occurred over recent years, are the new norm . . . Australia and New Zealand should look for opportunities to rebuild our historical capacity to integrate Australian and New Zealand force elements in the Anzac tradition."

While ever-improving Defence Force interoperability is crucial to the security interests of both New Zealand and Australia, New Zealand should not simply replicate Australia's force structure on a smaller scale. Our defence capabilities should take into account our specific needs and complement those of Australia's.

The B757s, for example, are platforms with capabilities that complement Australia's 737s and will complement the A330s they are acquiring. Our Multi Role Vessel, HMNZS Canterbury, complements Australia's Kanimbla class amphibious transport ships. In these cases the platforms and the capabilities they represent are not just interoperable; they ensure that between them,  the Anzac forces cover the full range of capabilities required.

This Government recognises the importance of routinely working with other militaries and international partners if we are to continue to maintain professional excellence.

Given the size of our economy and the regional circumstances I have mentioned, New Zealand's contribution beyond our region will primarily be niche capabilities based on the unique skills that we have built over decades. It is important that these are at a level of excellence if they are to be valued.

Defence management and procurement

This Government has stated its view that a fresh look at the quality of procurement and budgetary procedures within the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF is needed, with a particular focus on capability and personnel requirements.

The New Zealand Defence Force must be equipped with the right tools for the job if it is to deploy effectively on the broad spectrum of tasks that may be demanded of it.

The discussion document being prepared for release will outline the extensive programme of acquisitions undertaken by the NZDF across all three services over the past 15 years.

We have very recently taken delivery of HMNZS Taupo, the fourth and final Inshore Patrol Vessel purchased as part of Project Protector, and you will have seen the press coverage of the first test flight of our NH-90 in France earlier this month.

The acquisition of new capabilities must be done in accordance with sound process and management.

As a member of the Opposition I made no secret of my wish to see a thorough analysis of the quality of procurement and budgetary procedures within the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Force.

The review will need to consider how best to manage not only procurement but also Defence infrastructure and real estate.

It is worth noting an example from the previous government. AMP Capital Property owns Defence House in Wellington. No Defence assets were sold to build Defence House. Defence House is an example of an effective partnership between private industry and defence. Such partnerships will be considered as part of a Review that must suggest ways forward to improve Defence infrastructure.

We are committed through this Review to a full consideration of options that will see our Defence Force in facilities that meet contemporary expectations. It is time we moved on from refurbishing World War II facilities that were designed with less than a 10-year life.

It is a combination of people and platforms that make up capability in the NZDF. Decisions made today impact on the options available for tomorrow, and this is true of personnel as much as it is for military platforms.

That is why recruitment and retention is a crucial part of what this Review must cover. It must range over not only New Zealand's strategic environment and military capabilities, but also personnel questions, the role of the Reserves and defence funding arrangements.

Personnel is such a crucial part of Defence that the Associate Minister will be leading two companion studies that focus on specific aspects of this area. She will also examine options for improvements in New Zealand's defence industry.

Summary and conclusion

In summary, I would reiterate that:

First, we need to more clearly understand how defence contributes to our security, both within our region and in respect of advancing our interests in the wider international context.

Second, New Zealand needs defence capabilities matched to our strategic interests and those capabilities must be primarily focused on a reasonably foreseeable range of military deployments.

Third, our Defence establishment needs to be more efficiently configured to manage a full range of operations and the complexity of the defence procurement process.

We all have our views on how the defence and security of New Zealand is best served and your views are crucial to the success of this Review.

Defence policy should set the agenda, not simply re-institute the mind-sets of the past.

In the words of the 20^th-century military historian and theorist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart:

"It should be the duty of every soldier to reflect on the experiences of the past, in the endeavour to discover improvements, in his particular sphere of action, which are practicable in the immediate future."

I invite you to put aside convention and help us to develop a practical and independent assessment of New Zealand's defence and security.