As a community of nations, we have put up a variety of solutions to how we respond to threats from both the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to new forms of terrorism.

The heightened sense of insecurity and vulnerability since the attacks on city office blocks, using domestic airliners in September 2001, and the more recent revelations about the extent of global networks of illegal trade in nuclear componentry, have brought new vigour and urgency to the debate. And I believe we've witnessed some of that in here today.

The attack on New York told us that there were non-state actors able to mount significant assaults. With the revelations of illegal trade in nuclear componentry, we fear the marriage of effective assaults that use such weapons. It is shattering to contemplate.

We can all agree on our goal – to secure a safer world, and a more economically and socially just world plus an even-handed environment that is more conducive to non-proliferation. But the path by which we might reach that safer place has yet to be marked out.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed on 28 April this year, calls on all States to “promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery”.

I would like to thank our Australian hosts for doing just that, for providing this opportunity for a group of Asia-Pacific neighbours to get together – with Director General El Baradei and with Ambassador Duarte, president-designate of the NPT Review Conference -- to exchange views on some of the most urgent global security issues confronting us today.

My brief is to comment on implementation of Resolution 1540, and I shall do that – opening up some questions I hope Ambassador Motoc will then respond to, as chair of the 1540 Committee. But first I want to remind you of the wider context in which this sits, and the dimensions of the debate that is underway.

Wider context

In less than a month, we shall be poring over the report of the High Level Panel appointed by the Secretary General to consider the capability of the United Nations to respond to challenges from WMD, to challenges from unfulfilled development goals and to challenges posed by the ways some parts of the United Nations system go about their business.

Looking ahead to next year, we shall await the report of Mr El Baradei’s expert group on access to the nuclear fuel cycle, which I hope will be referred to the NPT conference. Also next year we can expect the report of the Blix Commission. In the meantime, the G8 will be refining its proposals on proliferation put forward this year.

We already have on the table for discussion a range of far reaching proposals – from President Bush, from Mr El Baradei, from the G8, and from such bodies as the Carnegie Endowment. Some of these are creative and compelling in their logic. Some are controversial and potentially divisive.

To guide us through, can we agree on some principles that all countries respecting the rule of law can sign up to?

The goal of disarmament is New Zealand's guiding principle, and one we must not lose sight of while we focus on the threat of proliferation, and the insecurity threats that can surround the peaceful use of nuclear power.

Points from IPA seminar

Earlier this year I had the privilege of participating in a seminar in New York jointly organised and funded by New Zealand and the International Peace Academy under David Malone. The theme was Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations.

There were several points especially relevant to this session that emerged from the discussion that I would like to share with you. I believe that recognising and resolving these can help us build consensus around principles we can use to set our compass, and identify the practical actions we should aim to take.

The first observation is that New Zealand sees an effective multilateral treaty system, universalised and with robust universal verification measures, as the firm foundation and framework for other responses.

Our hope is that recognition of the need for new responses to the risks of proliferation of WMD, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which New Zealand has endorsed, will act as a catalyst for strengthening the existing architecture.

A second point with particular relevance for the Non-proliferation Review Conference in 2005 was the observation that “broad and transparent compliance with international norms over the long term is not sustainable if a small group of states continually imposes non-proliferation demands on other states without respecting the bargains of the multilateral framework”. We need to strengthen mutual respect if we are to rebuild trust.

The third relevant point from the March seminar relates directly to Security Council Resolution 1540. The good intentions of the resolution were fully acknowledged, but it was observed that “a number of current institutional deficiencies will likely contribute to a continued lack of resolution: (1) the lack of an inspections regime (2) the lack of criteria to assess proliferation threats; and (3) the lack of a basis in international law to enforce non-proliferation norms for states outside the treaty regimes”.

I shall be interested to hear how Ambassador Motot sees these concerns being answered. They do raise a larger issue on which New Zealand voiced our reservations when UNSCR 1540 was adopted.

The issue here is whether the Security Council is the best place to take up problems such as non-proliferation, or whether this is asking the Council to assume a “legislative” role which goes beyond its mandate?

This issue first came up in the context of UNSCR 1373 which post September 2001 set up the Counter-terrorism Committee. Most countries accept that there is a need for the Security Council to act urgently and decisively in matters of international peace and security.

New Zealand fully accepts this, but we do at the same time hope that resort to Chapter VII binding resolutions without going through the normal treaty shaping processes would be the exception rather than the rule.

Implementing UNSCR 1540
Which brings me to the specific issue of implementing UNSCR 1540. Like other countries represented here, New Zealand has just completed its first report to the Committee. We had existing legislation that allowed New Zealand to meet almost all the requirements of the resolution’s operative paragraphs.

We found this a useful exercise, drawing in the different government agencies to identify areas of potential vulnerability. It was a reasonably straightforward process for New Zealand. We already belong to several export control regimes and we have a national control list in place.

But the reporting process highlighted for us some areas where we still need to strengthen our domestic legislation. We found for example that currently we do not have legislation expressly prohibiting trafficking and brokering of WMD. Though we have legislation prohibiting the export or import of WMD in the first instance and export controls which regulate strategic goods, we are now looking at brokering controls as part of our current review of export control legislation.

For those countries who have yet to set up the necessary legislation and national control mechanisms, we are acutely aware that it will take a major effort and commitment of resources to comply with UNSCR 1540. OP7 recognises that some States are likely to need assistance to implement the resolution.

Given the heavy imposition on smaller states from such international standard setting, New Zealand and Australia would like to be able to assist those in our region, and in particular our Pacific neighbours, who would welcome some support in implementing 1540. It is great to see the two largest island states here – PNG and Fiji. But we have many smaller states – Tonga (125,000), Tuvalu, Kiribati – containers/financial institutions etc.

We have begun a dialogue on what form of assistance would be most useful. Our discussions this week will help to define ways we can support each other around our region, and which countries will be in a position to share experience, technical expertise or other resources. I hope this will be one of the practical outcomes from our conference.

Next steps on UNSCR 1540

New Zealand welcomes UNSCR 1540 as a new initiative and a step along the path of combating the proliferation of WMD. We value the way 1540 imposes restraints on those countries that have chosen to stand outside the major disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

But at the same time we recognise a risk that this could become an empty reporting exercise.

We said at the time of the debate that the resolution will not succeed in its aim without the support and acceptance of Member States. The UNSCR 1540 Committee is now up and running, and the expert panel is about to be appointed.

To continue building commitment, the Security Council needs to ensure an ongoing and open dialogue with Member States, including through the reporting process. Passing the resolution and setting up its supporting machinery is good progress in just over six months, but now the real work begins – as I am sure Ambassador Motoc is keenly aware.

There is more definition to be done, of the purpose of the resolution and the political and technical steps needed to prevent the transfer of WMD to non-state actors.

If the resolution fails, it will undermine the Security Council’s credibility and make dealing with the problem of non-proliferation of WMD to non-state actors much harder.

I said at the outset I would close with some questions for Ambassador Motoc, which I am sure he is planning to cover for us, and some for our panel discussion.

Questions

·How does Ambassador Motoc see his role in sustaining the momentum of the 1540 Committee after the first round or two of reporting? (Experience with the Counter Terrorism Committee set up under UNSCR 1373 suggests that initial commitment and enthusiasm can dissipate.)
·If there are signs of a weakening of commitment, how much of that is because it was a Security Council resolution, rather than one won from the General Assembly? Can more haste result in less speed? Are there better ways through other conventions of building security? Eg Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
·How can the work of the Committee provide leverage to strengthen international cooperation on export controls? What should be its relationships with the IAEA and the OPCW?

·In his recent statement at the Pugwash conference in Seoul DG El Baradei juxtaposed the fragmented nature of export controls and their flimsiness as a defence against the extensive illicit market for the supply of nuclear items. This in turn has been facilitated by electronic information exchange and interlinked financial systems. He notes that at present, export control information is not systematically shared with the Agency. My question is – why don’t we encourage governments to share this information on an appropriately confidential basis with the IAEA?